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A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process.
The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants
were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments. Participants were not asked to
reason but instead rated the sentences for liking (Experiment 1) and physical brightness (Experiments
2–3). Sentences that followed logically from preceding sentences were judged to be more likable and
brighter. Two other factors thought to be linked to implicit processing—sentence believability and facial
expression—had similar effects on liking and brightness ratings. The authors conclude that sensitivity to
logical structure was implicit, occurring potentially automatically and outside of awareness. They discuss
the results within a fluency misattribution framework and make reference to the literature on discourse
comprehension.
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The idea that logic and intuition represent different modes of
thinking has deep roots in philosophy and psychology, and it
continues to shape theories in many cognitive and social domains
(for a review, see Evans, 2008). According to the dual process
theory of reasoning, maximizing the probability of computing a
normatively correct response typically requires a reasoning pro-
cess that is deliberate, effortful and time-consuming. The alterna-
tive is to use heuristics that are intuitive, simple, and fast but often
result in suboptimal performance (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011;
although see also Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group,
1999, for a different perspective). For example, in situations that
require deduction, people are prone to accept conclusions based on
readily accessible beliefs, regardless of their logical validity (Ev-
ans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Dual process theory classifies
formal reasoning and the use of heuristics as Type II and Type I
processes, respectively, and holds that the two types of processes
differ qualitatively. It has proven surprisingly difficult to reach a
consensus on what the critical differentiating qualities are (Evans
& Stanovich, 2013a). In the present study, we illustrate this diffi-
culty with regard to deductive reasoning. There is general agree-
ment that the ability to deduce logically correct conclusions for
novel problems is a Type II process (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b).
In the present study, we show with the use of implicit tests that this
reasoning ability possesses characteristics more typically associ-
ated with intuitive,1 heuristic responding.
De Neys (2012; also Handley & Trippas, 2015) offered several
reasons for believing that reasoning may be partly intuitive. When
people fail to make normatively correct judgments, implicit mea-
sures (response time, gaze duration) often reveal sensitivity to
normatively critical information. When people do make norma-
tively correct judgments, they often fail to mention critical aspects
of the normative solution in their verbal protocols. These findings
show that information relevant to reasoning can be activated
implicitly and thus perhaps outside of awareness, characteristic of
intuitive rather than deliberative responding.
Heuristics often rely on feelings of uncertain origin. For exam-
ple, people tend to rate perceptually or semantically coherent
stimuli as more recognizable, likable, and true (Reber & Un-
kelbach, 2010). One explanation for these implicit effects is pro-
vided by fluency misattribution accounts, which suggest that feel-
ings that arise from a variety of sources—processing fluency,
1 We use “intuitive” to indicate the quality of being nondeliberative and
at least partly opaque to conscious understanding or introspection. Auto-
maticity is a possible but not necessary component of this quality.
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semantic activation, familiarity, positive affect—are difficult to
differentiate. As a result, these feelings are often misattributed to
other sources (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Topolinski,
2011; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Mor-
sanyi and Handley (2012) used the fluency misattribution para-
digm to investigate the possibility that deductive reasoning possesses
elements that are intuitive and automatic. They hypothesized that if
this were true, logical arguments should give rise to feelings of
conceptual fluency even when the task does not explicitly call for
reasoning. In the study, participants viewed sentences and were asked
how much they liked them. Sentences that followed logically from the
preceding sentences were rated as more likable. Presumably the
enhanced fluency of logically valid sentences was misattributed to
positive affect.
Morsanyi and Handley considered the alternative explanation
that liking ratings were simply used by participants as a stand-in
for validity judgments. People may have claimed to “like” a
statement because they reasoned that it was logically valid. In
another version of the task, participants were shown the same
sentences but this time judged their logical validity. Dissociations
between validity and liking judgments revealed that participants
were not treating the two types of judgments as identical. Instruc-
tions that encouraged careful reasoning improved the accuracy of
validity judgments but had little effect on liking. Syllogistic figure
and working memory capacity, both of which are associated with
reasoning effectiveness, affected validity judgments but not liking.
Conversely, affective priming and a manipulation that allowed
participants to discount fluency cues affected liking but not valid-
ity judgments. These double dissociations suggest that there is a
component of the reasoning process that occurs implicitly even in
the absence of instructions to reason. It produces feelings that have
a seemingly unconscious influence on judgments unrelated to
logical validity. It seems resistant to factors that are known to
affect Type II processing. In sum, this component of reasoning has
characteristics of nondeliberative, intuitive, heuristic responding.
A problem with Morsanyi and Handley’s (2012) study was
raised by Klauer and Singmann (2013; see also, Singmann, Klauer,
& Kellen, 2014), who noted that in a subset of Morsanyi and
Handley’s materials involving complex syllogisms (Experiments 2
and 4), logical validity was confounded with the surface content of
the sentences. Klauer and Singmann found that when surface
context was properly counterbalanced, they did not observe an
effect of validity on the liking judgements. It is worth noting that
the simpler syllogisms used by Morsanyi and Handley did not
suffer from counterbalancing issues. Nevertheless, given the nov-
elty and potentially controversial nature of their conclusions, rep-
lication and extension of their findings is warranted. In the present
study we focused exclusively on relatively simple reasoning prob-
lems where the effects of implicit reasoning should most plausibly
arise. We used a new set of materials that addressed the issues
raised by Klauer and Singmann through randomly assigning prob-
lem contents to argument structures for each participant individu-
ally. Our aim was to demonstrate that logical validity can have an
incidental influence on judgments unrelated to logic. Experiment 1
replicated the findings of Morsanyi and Handley (2012) with
ratings of liking. Experiments 2 and 3 extended the results to a task
further divorced from logic, judgments of physical brightness.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined feelings of liking for sentences that
either did, or did not follow logically from previous sentences. In
addition to rigorously controlling the surface content of the mate-
rials, we also introduced a wider range of argument structures
(conditionals and disjunctions in addition to syllogisms) to test the
generality of Morsanyi and Handley’s (2012) findings. In addition
to validity, the believability of the statements was also manipu-
lated. Believability is a factor known to drive heuristic responding
in explicit reasoning tasks (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983).
Believability can also be thought of as a form of semantic coher-
ence, a factor known to produce positive affect. It is thought that
feelings of semantic fluency that result from processing coherent
materials are readily misattributed to feelings of liking (Topolinski
& Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993). Believability is therefore pre-
dicted to increase liking. This is of interest because the implicit
effect of believability, a factor associated with heuristic responding
in deduction, can be compared to the implicit effect of logical
validity, a factor associated with deliberate analytical responding.
Also, because the mechanism of fluency misattribution underlies
the predicted effects of both believability and validity, the effect of
one should parallel the effect of the other.
Method
Ethics statement. All experiments were approved by the eth-
ical committee of the Science and Environment Faculty at Plym-
outh University.
Participants. Forty-two psychology undergraduates from
Plymouth University (6 males) participated in exchange for course
credit (age range  18–35, M  21).
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believ-
ability (believable vs. unbelievable; note that for the conditionals
this refers to the believability of the conditional statement, whereas
for the other argument forms this refers to the conclusion), and
problem type (conditionals vs. disjunctions vs. syllogisms) were
manipulated within subjects.
Materials. We created a unique stimulus list of 144 trials for
each participant: 48 conditionals (24 modus ponens and 24 modus
tollens), 48 disjunctions (24 affirmation and 24 denial), and 48
simple syllogisms. Half of the modus ponens conditionals were
valid (if p then q, p, therefore q) and half were invalid (if p then q,
p, therefore not q—all negations were implicit). Half of the modus
tollens conditionals were valid (if p then q, not q, therefore not p)
and half were invalid (if p then q, not q, therefore p). Note that for
the conditionals, half the valid conclusions were affirmations and
half were implicit negations, and vice versa for the invalid ones.
Half of the (exclusive) affirmative disjunctions were valid (50%: p
or q, p, therefore not q; 50%: p or q, q, therefore not p—all
negations were explicit) and half were invalid (50%: p or q, p
therefore q; 50%: p or q, q therefore p). Half of the denial
disjunctions were valid (50%: p or q, not p, therefore q; 50%: p or
q, not q, therefore p) and half were invalid (50%: p or q, not p,
therefore not q; 50%: p or q, not q, therefore not p). Finally, half
of the syllogisms were determinately valid and half were determi-
nately invalid (these syllogisms were also used by Trippas, Han-
dley, & Verde, 2013, Experiment 1 – simple condition). Believ-
ability was manipulated by randomly assigning problem contents
to argument structures for each participant (Klauer & Singmann,
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1449IMPLICIT LOGIC
2013; Trippas et al., 2013). For the conditionals and the disjunc-
tions, the item contents were further developed from those used by
Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011). Examples of each of the
problem types can be found in Table 1. The full set of generating
contents can be found in the Online Supplementary Materials.
Klauer and Singmann (2013) demonstrated that it is crucial
for item contents and logical structures to be randomized for
each participant individually. To avoid issues associated with
suboptimal randomization, and to preempt other potential heu-
ristic confounds, we used the following extensive randomiza-
tion procedure. Within the conditionals 24 item contents were
randomly assigned to one of the four possible modus ponens
(MP) problem cells (i.e., valid-believable, invalid-believable,
valid-unbelievable, invalid-unbelievable) and one of the four
possible modus tollens (MT) problem cells for each participant
individually for a total of 48 trials. This was done in such a way
that there was no systematic link between the probability of an
item content belonging to a certain cell (e.g., valid-believable)
in its MP guise and it belonging to another cell (e.g., invalid-
believable) in its MT guise. The same held true within the
disjunctions, with the added constraint that p and q were
switched around randomly half the time to ensure the factual
class was not consistently presented first or second (e.g., for
half the trials the premise would be “Either the sky is green or
it is blue” rather than “Either the sky is blue or it is green”). For
the syllogisms we randomly assigned for each participant half
of 48 problem contents to 12 valid syllogisms (each presented
twice) and the remaining half of the contents to 10 invalid
syllogisms (each presented twice) and 4 additional invalid
syllogisms (each presented once). For half the syllogisms the
conclusion direction went from A to C and for the other half
from C to A, and this was true for both valid and invalid
syllogisms. Similarly, half the time the conclusion featured the
“some” quantifier and half the time it featured the “no” quan-
tifier, and this was the case within each validity by believability
cell. Premise believability was controlled for using pseudoword
nonsense middle-terms (e.g., mips). Conclusion believability
was manipulated using category membership problem contents,
with 16 categories (amphibians, birds, boats, cars, criminals,
furniture, dogs, drinks, fish, fruits, insects, reptiles, tools, trees,
vegetables, weapons) and three members per category (e.g., for
amphibians: frogs, salamanders, toads; etc.). A full overview of
the materials can be found in the online supplement.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually on comput-
ers running E-Prime in small groups of no more than 5. After
providing informed consent, the participants were presented with
the following instructions:
In this experiment we are interested in how much you like various
statements.
You will repeatedly be presented with three sentences in succession
for a short amount of time. Please read these sentences and indicate
how much you like the final sentence on a scale from 1 (dislike it very
much) to 6 (like it very much).
1  dislike it very much
2  dislike it quite a bit
3  dislike it somewhat
4  like it somewhat
5  like it quite a bit
6  like it very much
Table 1
Examples of the Materials Used in Experiments 1–3
Problem type
Valid Invalid
Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable
Conditionals
Modus ponens P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is sad [q]
P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is happy [q]
P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is happy [q]
P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is sad [q]
P2: A child is crying [p] P2: A child is crying [p] P2: A child is crying [p] P2: A child is crying [p]
C: The child is sad [q] C: The child is happy [q] C: The child is sad [¬q] C: The child is happy [¬q]
Modus tollens P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is sad [q]
P1: If a child is laughing [p],
then it is sad [q]
P1: If a child is laughing [p],
then it is sad [q]
P1: If a child is crying [p],
then it is sad [q]
P2: A child is happy [¬q] P2: A child is happy [¬q] P2: A child is happy [¬q] P2: A child is happy [¬q]
C: The child is laughing [¬p] C: The child is crying [¬p] C: The child is laughing [p] C: The child is crying [p]
Disjunctions
Affirmation P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P2: The sky is blue [p] P2: The sky is green [q] P2: The sky is green [q] P2: The sky is blue [p]
C: The sky is not green [¬q] C: The sky is not blue [¬p] C: The sky is blue [p] C: The sky is green [q]
Denial P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P1: Either the sky is blue [p]
or it is green [q]
P2: The sky is not green [¬q] P2: The sky is not blue [¬q] P2: The sky is not blue [¬p] P2: The sky is not green [¬q]
C: The sky is blue [p] C: The sky is green [p] C: The sky is not green [¬q] C: The sky is not blue [¬p]
Syllogisms P1: All wines are mips P1: All wines are mips P1: All wines are mips P1: All wines are mips
P2: No mips are tools P2: No mips are drinks P2: No mips are drinks P2: No mips are tools
C: No wines are tools C: No wines are drinks C: Some wines are drinks C: Some wines are tools
Note. p and q indicate the abstract structure of the arguments. ¬p and ¬q stand for “not p” and “not q”, respectively.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
1450 TRIPPAS, HANDLEY, VERDE, AND MORSANYI
When you make the liking judgment, please focus on your feeling
about the statement. Do not think about why you like or dislike the
statement, just go with your intuition and gut-feelings.
Please try to use the full extent of the scale (so use all possible values
from 1–6).
For each problem trial, participants were first presented with the
major premise for 2 seconds, then with the minor premise for 2
seconds, and finally with the conclusion and the response scale.
After making a response, the participant was instructed to press
space to advance to the next problem.
Results
Analysis approach. We used a top-down Bayesian analysis
of variance (ANOVA) hypothesis testing approach with default
priors (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) followed up
with a Bayesian hierarchical unequal variance signal detection
theory (SDT, see, e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) estimation
approach (Kruschke, 2014; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013).2 One
advantage of a Bayesian hypothesis testing approach over its
frequentist alternative is that the former allows us to interpret data
as providing evidence for the null by calculating Bayes factors
(BFs). After identifying the main effects and interactions which
had sufficient support given the data, indices of sensitivity were
estimated for each factor using a Bayesian hierarchical unequal
variance SDT model (Morey, Pratte, & Rouder, 2008). Here,
sensitivity refers to differences in the distribution of liking ratings
between levels of a factor, for example, between logically valid
and invalid statements. The SDT analysis is a useful supplement in
that it considers the whole distribution of ratings but makes no
assumptions about the uniformity of the distributions, or the equal-
ity of their variance ratio (Heit & Rotello, 2014; Trippas, Handley,
& Verde, 2014).
ANOVA. We analyzed the liking judgments using a 2 (Log-
ical Validity: valid vs. invalid)  2 (Argument Believability:
believable vs. unbelievable)  3 (Problem Type: conditional vs.
disjunction vs. syllogism) top down BF ANOVA with default JZS
priors and a random effect for participants to account for the
repeated measures nature of the three factors.3 BFs were calculated
by comparing the full model containing all main effects and
interactions with the model in which the effect of interest was
removed. BF 1 indicate more evidence in favor of the inclusion
of the effect, BF 1 indicate more evidence against the inclusion
of the effect.
Logically valid conclusions were liked more than logically
invalid ones, BF  5.8  10165. Believable arguments were also
liked more than unbelievable ones, BF  1.5  10193. There was
also a main effect of problem type, suggesting certain argument
forms were liked more than others, BF 366. Logical validity and
problem type interacted, suggesting the effect of logic on liking
differed as a function of argument form, BF  2.6  1012. There
was evidence against the logic by belief interaction (BF  0.26)
and the three-way interaction (BF  0.33). The data was uninfor-
mative with regards to the Belief  Problem Type interaction
(BF  0.98). Raw means and standard deviations for the liking
judgments per condition can be found in Table 2.
SDT estimation. We estimated sensitivity to each of the ef-
fects for which substantial evidence was found given the model
and the data (Logic, Belief, Problem Type, and the Logic 
Problem Type interaction). We estimated da for each factor by
applying a Bayesian hierarchical unequal variance SDT model
using JAGS to the liking ratings (sensitivity estimates are based on
the means of the hyper-distributions; see code in Online Supple-
mentary Materials for specifics). We ran four chains with 20,000
iterations each, with 1,000 samples burn-in and no thinning. For all
of the reported analysis, all chains converged well (all
Rhat 1.10). The reported 95% highest density intervals (HDI)
mark the span of values that are most credible and cover 95% of
the distribution (Kruschke, 2014).
Participants liked valid problems more than invalid ones, M
da-logic  0.89, 95% HDI  0.52–1.33. Similarly, participants
liked believable arguments more than unbelievable ones, M
da-belief  0.85, 95% HDI  0.59–1.14. Participants did not
credibly like conditionals more than disjunctions, M da-PT-CD 
0.03, 95% HDI0.09–0.15. In contrast, there was a preference
for conditionals over syllogisms, M da-PT-CS  0.16, 95%
HDI  0.04–0.28. There was a marginal trend for disjunctions to
be preferred over syllogisms, M da-PT-DS  0.20, 95%
HDI  0.05–0.51. We also investigated the Logic  Problem
Type interaction by estimating sensitivity to logic for each prob-
lem type individually. Participants liked valid conditionals more
than invalid ones, M da-logic-conditional  0.81, 95% HDI 
0.58–1.06. Participants also liked valid disjunctions more than
invalid ones, M da-logic-disjunction  1.37, 95% HDI  0.69–
2.13. Participants liked valid syllogisms more than invalid ones, M
da-logic-syllogism  0.53, 95% HDI  0.27–0.83.
Discussion
Although the task made no reference to logical validity, partic-
ipants liked statements more when they formed part of a logically
valid argument. The size of the validity effect was comparable to
that of believability, which also enhanced liking. Much previous
work has shown that the believability of a statement can influence
explicit judgments of logical validity. According to dual process
theories of deduction, belief bias (Evans et al., 1983) occurs when
the automatic activation of semantic information encourages heu-
ristic responding, a Type I process. Because the influence of
existing beliefs is intuitive, it may not be surprising that believ-
ability would have an implicit effect on unrelated judgments.
Indeed, other factors related to semantic coherence have been
shown to implicitly influence feelings of liking (Topolinski &
Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993). On the other hand, it seems
uncharacteristic for deliberative reasoning, a Type II process, to
have a similar implicit effect on unrelated judgments.
Morsanyi and Handley (2012), whose findings are conceptually
replicated in Experiment 1, proposed that people are sensitive to
logical structure at an intuitive level. We will examine the case for
this in detail later. For the moment, we consider an alternative
possibility. It may be that participants, uninstructed, decided to use
2 In all three experiments, the use of traditional frequentist and alterna-
tive Bayesian analyses produced the same conclusions. These alternative
analyses can be found in the online supplementary materials.
3 We used the anovaBF() function from the BayesFactor R package with
settings rscaleFixed  “medium” and whichModel  “top”. The exact
syntax can be found in the online supplementary materials. JAGS code for
the SDT model can also be found in the online supplement.
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1451IMPLICIT LOGIC
normative validity as a criterion for liking. As noted earlier,
Morsanyi and Handley offered evidence against this possibility
with the observation that factors mediating the validity effect in an
explicit reasoning task differed from those mediating the validity
effect in the implicit liking task. In other words, participants were
not treating the two types of judgments as identical. Nevertheless,
it seems plausible that if participants were to intentionally deduce
the validity of the statements, they might view a state of “correct-
ness” as more likable. The next experiment aimed to avoid this by
using an implicit task with no plausible connection to logical
validity.
Experiment 2
Manipulating the ease of perceptual processing can influence
unrelated judgments. For example, enhanced picture clarity leads
to higher ratings of liking (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998),
and perceptual priming and text uniformity lead to increased
familiarity judgments (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea &
Leboe, 2003). According to the fluency misattribution account,
perceptual fluency produces a feeling that is ambiguous and dif-
ficult to distinguish from other internal signals (e.g., Mandler,
Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). The corollary is that internal
signals produced by other processes might be misattributed to
perceptual processing. We hypothesized that this would be the case
for the implicit aspects of logical validity observed in Experiment
1. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the materials from the
previous experiment but this time judged the physical brightness of
the statements as presented on the screen. To the layman, the
criteria for brightness are more narrowly defined than for “liking”
and do not plausibly include the semantic or syntactic content of
the materials. To ensure an explicit focus on physical cues, bright-
ness of the stimuli was varied independently of the other variables
(i.e., logical validity and argument believability), and participants
were shown examples of low and high brightness sentences to
ensure an understanding of what constituted a correct response
within the context of the experiment. Given the observed pos-
itive relationship between enhanced perceptual fluency and
positive affect (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo,
2001), the findings of Experiment 1 lead to the prediction that
validity (and believability) should encourage higher ratings of
physical brightness.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight psychology undergraduates from
Plymouth University (6 male) participated in exchange for course
credit (age range  18–41, M  21).
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believ-
ability (believable vs. unbelievable), brightness (high vs. low), and
problem type (conditionals vs. disjunctions vs. syllogisms) were
manipulated within subjects.
Materials. Materials were created as in Experiment 1. Bright-
ness was manipulated by randomly assigning half of the problems
in each Logic  Belief  Problem Type cell to be high or low
brightness. High and low brightness trials differed in the contrast
between the problem text (shades of gray) and the background
(white). All of the text presented within a trial (including the major
premise, the minor premise, the conclusion, and the response
scale) had identical contrast levels. Stimuli were created by as-
signing a red-green-blue (RGB) value (x, x, x), with x drawn from
a normal distribution with   30,   1 for high, and   40,
  1 for low brightness. Based on pilot work, these values
ensured that brightness judgments were possible without being
trivially easy.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually on comput-
ers under controlled lighting conditions in small groups of no more
than five. After providing informed consent, the participants were
presented with examples of high and low brightness sentences (see
Figure 1). The following instructions were presented:
You will repeatedly be presented with three sentences in succession
for a short amount of time. Please read these sentences and indicate
whether the final statement is high or low brightness on a scale from
1 (certainly low brightness) to 6 (certainly high brightness).
1  certainly low brightness
2  probably low brightness
Table 2
Experiment 1: Liking Judgements Per Condition
Problem type
Valid, M (SD) Invalid, M (SD)
Believable Unbelievable Total Believable Unbelievable Total
Conditional 4.67 (1.48) 3.51 (1.73) 4.09 (1.71) 3.32 (1.72) 2.32 (1.49) 2.82 (1.68)
Disjunction 4.96 (1.33) 3.35 (1.87) 4.16 (1.81) 3.28 (1.79) 2.10 (1.39) 2.69 (1.71)
Syllogism 4.16 (1.51) 2.99 (1.61) 3.58 (1.67) 3.54 (1.63) 2.24 (1.27) 2.89 (1.60)
Figure 1. Screenshot from the experiment. High brightness sentences had
red-green-blue (RGB) values around (30, 30, 30), low brightness sentences
had RGB values around (40, 40, 40). All sentences were presented against
a white (255, 255, 255) background.
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3  guess low brightness
4  guess high brightness
5  probably high brightness
6  certainly high brightness
The brightness differences are quite subtle, so make use of your gut
feeling and intuition when making a judgment. Occasionally you will
have to guess. Once again, make sure you do this on the basis of your
gut feeling.
Also make sure you use the full extent of the scale (so use all possible
values from 1 to 6).
There will be a short memory test at the end of the experiment to
check whether you read all the sentences, so make sure that you read
all of them.
Results
ANOVA. We analyzed the brightness judgments using a 2
(Logical Validity: valid vs. invalid)  2 (Argument Believability:
believable vs. unbelievable) 2 (Brightness: high contrast vs. low
contrast)  3 (Problem Type: conditional vs. disjunction vs. syl-
logism) top down BF ANOVA with default JZS priors and a
random effect for participants as in Experiment 1. Logically valid
conclusions were rated as more bright than invalid ones, BF 
1.3  1013. Believable arguments were also rated as more bright
than unbelievable ones, BF  2.8  109. High contrast conclusions
were judged as brighter than low contrast conclusions, BF  9.0 
1084. There was substantial evidence against inclusion of the
remaining effects (all BF 0.13). Raw means and standard devi-
ations are presented in Table 4.
SDT estimation. We estimated sensitivity to each of the com-
ponents in favor of which substantial evidence was found (logic,
belief, brightness) using a Bayesian hierarchical UVSDT model.
Participants judged valid arguments as physically brighter than
invalid arguments, M da-logic  0.24, 95% HDI  0.04–0.46.
Participants judged believable arguments as brighter than unbe-
lievable arguments, M da-belief  0.21, 95% HDI  0.03–0.41.
As would be expected, participants judged high brightness prob-
lems as brighter than low brightness problems, M da-brightness 
0.68, 95% HDI  0.34–1.12.
Discussion
Participants judged valid statements which followed logically
from the preceding sentences as being physically brighter than
invalid statements. As in the previous experiment, there was a
parallel effect of believability. Believable statements were judged
to be brighter than unbelievable statements. The implicit influence
of logical validity on a judgment whose criteria involved purely
physical characteristics is surprising. However, the results are
conceptually consistent with those of Experiment 1 and extend
them to a task that is even further removed from the explicit
requirement to reason logically. Experiment 3 sought to replicate
the brightness findings alongside a manipulation of affect that, like
believability, was predicted to influence brightness judgments.
Experiment 3
Theories of embodied emotion hold that adopting a facial ex-
pression is sufficient to produce its associated affective state.
Because people are typically unclear about the source of the affect,
it is readily misattributed to an external source. For example,
Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) found that people rated car-
toons as funnier when they held a pen between their teeth (facil-
itating muscles responsible for smiling) than when they held it
between their lips. Verde, Stone, Hatch, and Schnall (2010) found
that the same manipulation of expression led people to judge
words as more familiar.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the manipulation of believability served
to demonstrate that a factor known to drive heuristic responding
Table 3
Experiment 2: Brightness Judgments Per Condition
Problem type
Logic, M (SD) Belief, M (SD) Brightness, M (SD)
Valid Invalid Believable Unbelievable High Low
Conditional 3.96 (1.46) 3.71 (1.47) 3.99 (1.45) 3.68 (1.48) 4.18 (1.44) 3.49 (1.41)
Disjunction 4.01 (1.46) 3.64 (1.52) 3.94 (1.48) 3.72 (1.52) 4.14 (1.50) 3.52 (1.45)
Syllogism 3.88 (1.43) 3.69 (1.49) 3.87 (1.43) 3.70 (1.48) 4.13 (1.44) 3.43 (1.39)
Total 3.95 (1.45) 3.68 (1.49) 3.93 (1.45) 3.70 (1.49) 4.15 (1.46) 3.48 (1.42)
Table 4
Experiment 3: Brightness Judgments Per Condition
Problem type
Logic, M (SD) Belief, M (SD) Brightness, M (SD) Pen condition, M (SD)
Val Inval Bel Unbel High Low Fac Inh
Condition 4.02 (1.49) 3.84 (1.58) 3.98 (1.52) 3.89 (1.56) 4.19 (1.51) 3.68 (1.52) 3.97 (1.57) 3.90 (1.50)
Disjunction 4.00 (1.56) 3.69 (1.58) 3.95 (1.56) 3.74 (1.59) 4.11 (1.56) 3.58 (1.55) 3.91 (1.60) 3.78 (1.55)
Syllogism 3.99 (1.50) 3.76 (1.53) 3.93 (1.49) 3.81 (1.54) 4.14 (1.51) 3.61 (1.48) 3.97 (1.55) 3.78 (1.49)
Total 4.00 (1.56) 3.76 (1.52) 3.95 (1.52) 3.81 (1.57) 4.14 (1.53) 3.62 (1.52) 3.95 (1.57) 3.82 (1.52)
Note. Val  valid; Inval  invalid; Bel  believable; Unbel  unbelievable; Fac  facilitation; Inh  inhibition.
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1453IMPLICIT LOGIC
can implicitly influence liking and brightness judgments. The
parallel effects of believability and logical validity suggest that
like the former, the latter might stem from a process possessing
heuristic, intuitive qualities. In Experiment 3, the manipulation of
facial expression was meant to serve a similar function. The
misattribution of affective feelings produced by facial expression
is believed to result from intuitive heuristics that people use to
interpret ambiguous internal signals. Finding parallel effects on
brightness ratings of expression and logical validity might be
suggestive about the qualities of the process responsible for the
latter effect.
Method
Participants. Seventy-four participants sampled from the
population in Plymouth participated in exchange for a small fee
(age range  18–70, M  31).
Design. Logical validity (valid vs. invalid), argument believ-
ability (believable vs. unbelievable), brightness (high vs. low), and
argument type (conditionals vs. disjunctions vs. syllogisms) were
manipulated within subjects. Simulated smiling (smile-facilitation
vs. smile-inhibition) was manipulated between subjects. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the facilitation (N  37) or the
inhibition (N  37) condition. One person dropped out during the
experiment because they struggled with the brightness judgment
task.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment
2, with the exception that people were asked to put a pen between
either their lips or their teeth for the duration of the experiment.
The experimenter demonstrated to each participant exactly how to
put the pen in their mouth. Participants were allowed breaks
between trials but were instructed to put the pen back in the correct
position upon continuing. The experimenter monitored pen posi-
tion throughout the study.
Results
ANOVA. We analyzed the brightness judgments using a 2
(Logical Validity: valid vs. invalid)  2 (Argument Believability:
believable vs. unbelievable) 2 (Brightness: high contrast vs. low
contrast)  3 (Problem Type: conditional vs. disjunction vs. syl-
logism)  2 (Simulated Smiling: smile-facilitation vs. smile-
inhibition) top-down BF ANOVA with default JZS priors and a
random effect for participants to account for the mixed nature of
the design. Logically valid conclusions were rated as brighter than
logically invalid ones, BF  3.6  1015. Believable arguments were
rated as brighter than unbelievable ones, BF  7720. High contrast
sentences were rated as brighter than low contrast ones, BF  3.0 
1077. With the exception of the Simulated Smiling  Brightness
interaction (BF  1.4) and the Simulated Smiling  Belief inter-
action (BF  0.50), for which the data was uninformative, there
was strong support in favor of the null for all remaining effects
(BFs 0.12). Means and standard deviations of the brightness
judgments can be found in Table 3.
Given our a priori interest in the effect of simulated smiling and
the inconclusive evidence for several interactions which included
simulated smiling as a component, we investigated the manipula-
tion in more detail. A BF contingency table analysis of indepen-
dence assuming independent multinomial distributions was run to
compare the distribution of brightness ratings for the simulated
smiling and the simulated frowning conditions. The analysis sug-
gested brightness ratings were distributed differently in both con-
ditions, 	2(5)  72.6, BF  8.5  108.
SDT estimation. Using a Bayesian hierarchical UVSDT
model, we estimated sensitivity to each of the components for
which strong evidence was found in the ANOVA (logic, belief,
brightness). Simulated smiling was assessed using a Bayesian
ordered probit regression given its between subjects nature (cf.
Kruschke, 2014). Participants’ judged valid arguments as more
physically bright than invalid ones, M da-logic  0.30, 95%
HDI  0.03–0.60. There was a marginal trend for participants to
judge believable arguments as brighter than unbelievable ones,
M da-belief  0.24, 95% HDI  0.10–0.64 (77% HDI 
0–.36). High brightness sentences were judged as brighter than
low brightness sentences, M da-brightness  1.42, 95% HDI 
0.28–3.49. Finally, a Bayesian ordered probit regression demon-
strated that the effect size of simulated smiling credibly differed
from 0, M d  0.11, 95% HDI  0.07–0.16.
Discussion
Replicating the key result of Experiment 2, logically valid
statements were judged to be physically brighter than their invalid
counterparts. Believability and facial expression (simulated smil-
ing) also tended to influence perceived brightness, although evi-
dence for the former was mixed, and exclusion of the latter from
the best fitting model suggests that it is a weaker effect.
General Discussion
Dual process theory has been able to accommodate a range of
disparate phenomena within a common framework, one which
draws converging support from other domains of cognition and
neuroscience (Evans, 2008). However, the fundamental question
regarding which qualities distinguish Type I and Type II processes
remains a matter of debate (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). According
to the dual process view, the computation of logical validity
requires deliberation, time and cognitive control. Heuristic re-
sponses, in contrast, are intuitive, fast, and often automatic. We
examined this dichotomy using implicit tests of reasoning. Partic-
ipants viewed sentences containing inherent logical structure. They
were not asked to reason about the sentences but instead judged
simply how much they liked them (Experiment 1) or how bright
they appeared on the screen (Experiments 2 and 3). Sentences that
followed logically from the preceding sentences were rated as
more likable and judged to be brighter than sentences that were
logically invalid. The implicit sensitivity to logical structure re-
vealed in judgments unrelated to reasoning suggests something
about the nature of the reasoning process. Although ostensibly a
Type II process, reasoning does not seem to be exclusively delib-
erative but instead possesses some qualities typically associated
with intuitive, heuristic processes.
Heuristics tend to be nondeliberative because they are imple-
mented quickly, sometimes automatically, and because people
may have limited insight about the source of these heuristics. An
example is the heuristic of using the processing fluency of a
stimulus to infer other, unrelated properties (for an alternative
example in terms of retrieval fluency, see Hertwig, Herzog,
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1454 TRIPPAS, HANDLEY, VERDE, AND MORSANYI
Schooler, & Reimer, 2008). Lack of insight into this process is
suggested by the fact that feelings of fluency can be misinterpreted
in different ways depending on the context (e.g., as feelings of
familiarity, liking, brightness; Mandler et al., 1987). Moreover,
people are more likely to make use of the heuristic when not aware
of the source of fluency. When made aware of the source, they
correctly reject fluency as irrelevant to the judgment at hand
(Goldinger & Hansen, 2005; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Whittlesea, 2002). In the present study,
we know that participants understood the brightness task because
they were able to differentiate different levels of text-to-
background contrast with above-chance accuracy. There is no
plausible reason to allow logical validity to inform judgments of
physical brightness. Nevertheless, there was a validity effect. It
seems reasonable to infer that participants lacked insight or aware-
ness of the implicit effects of logical structure. Had they been
aware, they should have rejected the information as irrelevant.
Along with logical validity, sentence believability and facial
expression also influenced judgments of liking and brightness. The
notion that participants were deliberately basing their judgments
on such a disparate collection of (irrelevant) information seems
implausible. An alternative explanation draws on a large body of
work investigating fluency misattribution. Psychological processes
produce signals that are often ambiguous and require interpreta-
tion. Other work has shown that positive affect produced by an
unrelated source can be misinterpreted as perceptual clarity or
familiarity (Strack et al., 1988; Verde et al., 2010), and feelings
associated with conceptual coherence can be misinterpreted as
feelings of liking (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Whittlesea, 1993).
The implicit effects of facial expression and believability therefore
have precedent, although our findings are novel with respect to the
materials and tasks used. Aside from Morsanyi and Handley’s
(2012) earlier study, the implicit effect of validity is novel. We
speculate that comprehending logical validity, much like compre-
hending conceptual cohesion, produces feelings that are ambigu-
ous and open to misinterpretation. The implication is that the
reasoning process, at some level, produces output that is opaque to
understanding or introspection.
Although participants were not instructed to make logical de-
ductions while reading the sentences, we cannot rule out the
possibility that some may have done so spontaneously. This would
not change the conclusions drawn so far. Whether or not reasoning
was instigated deliberately, the implicit effects of reasoning seem
to be nondeliberate. However, there are other issues for which the
question of deliberate reasoning is relevant. Morsanyi and Handley
(2012) proposed that the implicit effect of logical structure was
evidence that the reasoning process itself was at least partly
intuitive. They noted that the validity effects observed in the
explicit and implicit reasoning tasks responded differently to var-
ious manipulations. For example, different instructions (known to
influence explicit reasoning) mediated the validity effect in the
explicit but not the implicit task. Conversely, fluency cues (known
to influence heuristic responding) mediated the validity effect in
the implicit but not the explicit task.
Although we did not have an explicit reasoning condition for
direct comparison, post hoc examination of response latencies
revealed a pattern atypical of explicit reasoning performance.
Deliberate reasoning, being slow and effortful, is less accurate
under time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Trippas et al.,
2013). This would lead us to expect that, if people had been
reasoning deliberately, the fastest responses in the implicit task
would show the weakest, or even no effect of validity. Combining
data from Experiments 2 and 3, the brightness judgments were
divided into faster (M  1.5 s) and slower (M  3.8 s) responses
via a median split on response latencies. A 2 (Conclusion Validity:
valid vs. invalid)  2 (Response Speed: faster vs. slower) BF
ANOVA showed that there was no evidence in favor or against a
logic x response speed interaction, BF  1.28. Nevertheless, we
conducted follow-up analyses which indicated that the effect of
logic on brightness judgments was present for both the faster (M
da-logic-quick  0.17, 95% HDI  0.13–0.21) and slower re-
sponses (M da-logic-slow  0.13, 95% HDI  0.08–0.17). Con-
trary to what would be expected if the validity effect was based on
deliberate reasoning, the effect was descriptively larger for the
faster responses.
These differences lead us to believe that whatever drives sensi-
tivity to logical validity in the implicit tasks, it is only a component
of the explicit reasoning process. Explicit reasoning may be largely
deliberative and resource-intensive, but it may include components
that are nondeliberative and more intuitive. There is some evidence
from the larger literature on reasoning models that speaks to this
idea. We already noted De Neys’ (2012) discussion of the finding
that people appear to be intuitively sensitive to the conflict be-
tween formal norms such as probability theory and heuristic fac-
tors such as stereotypes, but often unable to articulate critical
aspects of the reasoning process, such as this conflict detection.
These findings led to the proposal of a “logical intuitions” model
of reasoning according to which people have some degree of
intuitive sensitivity to all formal norms. According to this model,
the analytic-heuristic conflict is always detected, but formal re-
sponses are not made because it is not inhibited. On the other side
of the spectrum resides the “default-interventionist” model of
reasoning discussed by Evans and Stanovich (2013a). According
to this model, heuristic considerations always precede potential
analysis due to the autonomous nature of the former and the
necessity for working memory involvement of the latter. Occa-
sional failures to detect the conflict (i.e., monitoring failures) are
considered one of the main culprits for heuristic responding. Other
possible contenders tread the middle ground (e.g., Handley &
Trippas, 2015; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Sloman,
2014; Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). According
to Handley and Trippas’ Parallel Processing Model (PPM), for
instance, intuition and deliberation act in a parallel, race-like
fashion, simultaneously integrating the various problem compo-
nents (e.g., structure and knowledge) that are present during the
task at hand. The reason why occasionally heuristic considerations
outweigh analysis and vice versa is determined by features such as
the complexity of these components and the ease with which they
are processed. Our demonstration of implicit sensitivity to some—
relatively simple—logical structures is consistent with this latter
account. Whether implicit sensitivity to more complex formal
norms will also arise, as predicted by the logical intuitions model,
remains to be seen (see Handley & Trippas, 2015, for a more
detailed discussion of these and several other reasoning models).
We have proposed that valid arguments are associated with
increased fluency, but as of yet we can only speculate on the
mechanism that brings this about. Theories of discourse compre-
hension such as Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model
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1455IMPLICIT LOGIC
suggest that readers implicitly construct situational models through
associations and automatic inferences. It may be more difficult to
create coherent semantic models of invalid arguments, perhaps
because they describe impossible situations. Morsanyi and Hand-
ley (2012) offered an explanation along these lines for their liking
judgment results. They proposed that the ease with which the
concluding statement of a valid argument fits with the model
constructed from earlier statements produces a sense of fluency
that is then misattributed to another source. Whether fluency is tied
to the ease of creating any coherent semantic model, or more
specifically to the ability to create a logically coherent model, is an
interesting question for future investigation. Some support for the
latter comes from a study by Lea, O’Brien, Fisch, Noveck, and
Braine (1990) in which participants read narratives containing
propositional chains, for example:
Jerry thought: “I would like to wear either my checkered or my striped
shirt. Of course, if I wear my striped shirt I’ll have to wear my
matching blue trousers.” Jerry then discovered that his striped shirt
was wrinkled.
Later, participants preferred sentences which suggested that they
drew logically valid inferences (e.g., Jerry thought: “I guess I
won’t have to look for my blue trousers then”) over sentences that
were also plausible within the situational narrative but logically
invalid (Jerry thought: “I guess I’d better start looking for my blue
trousers”). Participants seemed to have generated the logical con-
clusions but were not necessarily aware of having done so.
The invalid arguments used in our study were determinately
invalid, meaning that it is impossible to construct a situation model
in which the conclusion holds given the premises. It would be
useful to compare these with indeterminately invalid arguments for
which it is possible to create a model that fits the conclusion. If
fluency is linked simply to the ease of creating a coherent model,
the validity effect might not be observed in the latter case whereas
it would be observed in both cases if fluency is linked to logical
validity.4 We should emphasize that either possibility is consistent
with the proposal that sensitivity to logical structure can arise in
ways that defy easy characterization as a strictly conscious, delib-
erative Type II process.
4 We are grateful to Karl Cristoph Klauer for proposing this experiment.
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